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AMENDMENT 
VINCENT J. SAMAR* 
This Article examines recent claims that the fetus be afforded the status of 
a person under the Fourteenth Amendment.  It shows that such claims do not 
carry the necessary objectivity to operate reasonably in a pluralistic society.  It 
then goes on to afford what a better view of personhood that could so operate 
might actually look like.  Along the way, this Article takes seriously the real 
deep concerns many have for the sanctity of human life.  By the end, it attempts 
to find a balance for those concerns with the view of personhood offered that 
should engage current debates about abortion and women’s rights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent efforts by some state legislatures1 and the federal Congress2 to pass 
laws declaring fetuses to be persons, and 2016 presidential candidate Mike 
Huckabee’s unilateral declaration that a fetus is a person under the Fourteenth 
Amendment,3 represent a renewal of an old attack on a woman’s privacy right 
to obtain an abortion.  In effect, such efforts might be a precursor to a future 
constitutional challenge to a woman’s right to choose abortion by suggesting 
that the United States Supreme Court’s view of who are persons, as set forth in 
its landmark Roe v. Wade decision,4 is somehow misguided if not also out-of-
step with that of the current society at large.  No doubt if the Court were to 
adopt such an interpretation, it would effectively undermine its earlier decision, 
which recognized a woman’s privacy right to obtain an abortion.5  That right 
would cease to exist if fetuses were recognized as persons, since abortion as a 
private action presupposes that it does not violate the basic interest of any 
person.6   
Additionally, these attempts and assertions beg a number of questions, 
including: What does it mean to be a person for purposes of invoking 
Fourteenth Amendment protection?  Is personhood a classification a legislature 
can assign?  Is the determination of who is a person inherently a religious or 
moral consideration?  Can there be an objective moral basis for defining 
personhood that would pick out those who the law has already recognized as 
persons but would not be limited to any one specific religious or moral 
tradition?  This Article presents a normative view of personhood that is both 
consistent with current law and is neither specifically religious nor moral in 
context to only one tradition; it also provides moral as well as empirical grounds 
for showing that the fetus is not a person in the requisite constitutional sense, 
especially at an early stage of pregnancy. 
 
1. Olivia Becker, At Least 46 Anti-Abortion Bills Are Already in Front of State Legislatures, 
VICE NEWS (Jan. 12, 2017), https://news.vice.com/story/at-least-46-anti-abortion-bills-are-already-in-
front-of-state-legislatures-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/N74R-4QTT]. 
2. Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 586, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). 
3. Bethania Palma Markus, Mike Huckabee’s Bizarre Fetal Personhood Proposal Would 
Criminalize Miscarriages, RAWSTORY (Aug. 7, 2015, 12:26 ET), 
http://www.rawstory.com/2015/08/mike-huckabees-bizarre-fetal-personhood-proposal-would-
criminalize-miscarriages/ [https://perma.cc/3DNS-YL52]. 
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
5. See id. at 154. 
6. See id. at 162. 
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Part II recaps the case history of the abortion debate in the United States, 
focusing primarily on seven principle cases: Roe v. Wade,7 City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,8 Thornburgh v. American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,9 Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services,10 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,11 
Gonzales v. Carhart,12 and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.13  
Additionally, Part II will briefly mention several other cases to illustrate how 
the issue arose, where the debate in this area has lied pre- and post-Roe, and to 
show that after Roe and until recently the legal status of abortion was not 
primarily focused on the question of personhood.  Part III discusses different 
views of what personhood means and why some views may be thought to be 
just religious or moral in nature.  Part IV poses the following question: What 
further criterion beyond mere morality might the Constitution require before a 
personhood argument should be recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment?  
Part V introduces a view of personhood that is at least partially empirical and 
objectively assessable such that it can be ascertained independently of any 
particular moral or religious claim.  Part VI considers the question of whether 
pain might present a challenge to claims that the fetus is not a person in the 
requisite sense.  A brief conclusion then follows for where the law ought to 
head. 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 
It is worth beginning by pointing out that Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
 
7. 410 U.S. 113. 
8. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
9. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
10. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
11. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
12. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
13. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
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process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.14 
Of particular relevance to the abortion debate are the protections afforded by 
the last two clauses, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”15  That is because the question of 
what protection the Fourteenth Amendment might provide rather than who 
might be a relevant person to receive protection is what has evolved, even if 
only very slowly, from the provision’s original post-Civil War Reconstruction 
purpose of protecting the former slaves,16 to eventually more generally 
protecting racial minorities,17 illegitimate people,18 women,19 mentally 
challenged persons,20 and more recently, gay and lesbian persons.21  Still, it 
really wasn’t until the issue of abortion landed on the Court’s docket in 1973 
that the question of who might be a relevant person to receive protection, as 
opposed to what protection they should receive, ever gets addressed. 
 
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
15. Id. 
16. See Richard Wormser, The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow: The Fourteenth Amendment Ratified 
(1868), PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories_events_14th.html [https://perma.cc/L38U-
8VTH] (last visited Dec. 28, 2017). 
17. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 11–12 (1967) (holding that state miscegenation 
laws prohibiting interracial marriage violated a fundamental right to marry and were a form of 
discrimination designed to promote white supremacy); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 
495 (1954) (recognizing that state mandated separate but so-called equal educational facilities for black 
and white children violated the Equal Protection clause). 
18. See Illegitimacy, JUSTIA, http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-14/90-
illegitimacy.html [https://perma.cc/H49Z-M7QS] (last visited Oct. 30, 2017). 
19. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996) (applying, in a landmark 7-1 
decision, intermediate scrutiny to strike down Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI’s) longstanding male-
only admissions policy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (finding that a woman had a 
fundamental constitutional privacy right to terminate a pregnancy subject only to maintaining maternal 
health before the end of the second trimester when the fetus becomes viable); see also Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (holding for the first time that administrative sex classifications required 
intermediate scrutiny).   
20. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) 
(ordering a more exacting form of scrutiny than traditional rational basis to govern claims of 
discrimination by mentally challenged individuals and setting aside a city ordinance denying a permit 
for such a living center). 
21. See, e.g., Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (holding that Arkansas cannot, 
consistent with Obergefell, deny to both partners of a same-sex marriage the right to be listed as parents 
on a child’s birth certificate in the same manner as is afforded to opposite-sex couples); Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015) (holding that states must license same-sex couples to marry 
and recognize legitimate out-of-state same-sex marriages). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s abortion regulation and its view about 
personhood really begins with Roe v. Wade22 and its companion case Doe v. 
Bolton.23  These two cases challenged the abortion laws in several states that 
made it a crime to “procure an abortion,” usually with an exception “for the 
purpose of saving the life of the mother.”24  In both of these cases, the Court 
found “that the [woman’s] right of personal privacy includes the abortion 
decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against 
important state interests.”25  The Court reached its decision after considering a 
line of privacy cases beginning with Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford,26 
and continuing through Griswold v. Connecticut,27 Stanley v. Georgia,28 and 
Eisenstadt v. Baird,29 among others, all in which “the Court . . . recognized that 
a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, 
does exist under the Constitution.”30  This right, the Court held, 
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept 
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel 
it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth 
Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.31 
What is especially significant for this discussion from the way the Court 
reached its decision is what it said concerning the fetus’s status under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Blackmun’s opinion for a seven-member 
majority took up the appellee’s (the State of Texas’s) claim “that the fetus is a 
‘person’ within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”32  
Noting that “[t]he Constitution does not define ‘person,’” Blackmun opined that 
its use, including its three references in the Fourteenth Amendment, “has 
 
22. 410 U.S. at 158. 
23. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
24. Roe, 410 U.S. at 117-18 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191, 1196 (West 1973)); 
accord Doe, 410 U.S. at 183. 
25. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154; see also Doe, 410 U.S. at 189. 
26. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
27. 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965). 
28. 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). 
29. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.  Elsewhere this Author shows that the line of cases beginning with 
Griswold v. Connecticut, and continuing through Roe v. Wade, afforded constitutional recognition of 
a private act separate from private information and states of affairs.  See VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 33-36, 73-74 (1991). 
31. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
32. Id. at 156. 
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application only postnatally.”33  Additionally, Justice Blackmun’s opinion 
found it persuasive that “throughout the major portion of the 19th century 
prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today,” 
indicating “that the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does 
not include the unborn.”34  Justice Blackmun then noted the different views 
about “when life begins” that have pervaded religious, medical, and legal 
treatments, with no one theory consistently applying across the law.35  Offering 
this historical analysis at the beginning of the majority’s opinion was important 
in order to exclude any claim to personhood for the unborn at the outset of the 
case.  If the abortion right was to be seen as truly a private act involving, in the 
first instance, only the interest of the woman, without including any other 
interest the state might believe itself obligated to protect, then the issue of the 
fetus’s status had to be considered.36  In sum, as Justice Blackmun noted: “[T]he 
unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.”37  
Thus, “[i]n view of all this, we do not agree that . . . Texas may override the 
rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.”38   
Next, the Court found “that the State does have an important and legitimate 
interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman . . . and 
that it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the 
potentiality of human life.”39  The Court noted that “[t]hese interests are 
separate and distinct.  Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches 
term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes ‘compelling.’”40  With this 
in mind, the Court went on to describe the points where the state’s interest 
operates to regulate abortion.41  At the end of the first trimester the state may 
regulate abortion but only “to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates 
to the preservation and protection of maternal health”; this was held to be a 
 
33. Id. at 157. 
34. Id. at 158. 
35. See id. at 159-62. 
36. SAMAR, supra note 30, at 68.  This Author notes that “[a]n action is self-regarding 
(private) . . . if and only if the consequences of the act impinge in the first instance on the basic interests 
[, freedom and well-being,] of the actor and not on the interests of the specified class of actors.”  Id.  
Here, the action’s mere “description without the inclusion of any additional facts or causal theories” 
must not suggest a conflict with any other person’s interest in the relevant group.  Id. at 67. 
37. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 162.  
40. Id. at 162-63. 
41. Id. at 163. 
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“‘compelling’ point” within current medical knowledge.42  The state’s 
important and legitimate interest in potential life becomes “compelling” only 
after the point where the fetus becomes viable, probably close to the end of the 
second trimester, because it is at that point that the fetus “presumably has the 
capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”43  So, the state may 
“proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve 
the life or health of the mother.”44 
Justices White and Rehnquist both wrote separate dissenting opinions, with 
Justice Rehnquist joining in Justice White’s dissent in Doe v. Bolton, where 
Justice White disdained the majority’s opinion, noting: 
The upshot [of today’s decision] is that the people and the 
legislatures of the 50 States are constitutionally disentitled to 
weigh the relative importance of the continued existence and 
development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum 
of possible impacts on the mother, on the other hand.45 
Justice Rehnquist’s disagreement was more to what he saw as the Court’s 
“sweeping invalidation of any restrictions on abortion during the first 
trimester.”46 
Ten years after Roe the Court would reaffirm its earlier holding in City of 
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, where it struck down local 
legislative restrictions on access to abortions and proclaimed that 
[a]lthough the Constitution does not specifically identify [the 
right to privacy], the history of this Court’s constitutional 
adjudication leaves no doubt that “the full scope of the liberty 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms 
of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the 
Constitution.”  Central among these protected liberties is an 
individual’s “freedom of personal choice in matters of 
marriage and family life.”47 
 
42. Id. 
43. Id.; see also Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Setting the Record Straight on Measuring Fetal Age and 
the ‘20-week Abortion,’ WASH. POST (May 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2015/05/26/setting-the-record-straight-on-measuring-fetal-age-and-the-20-week-
abortion/?utm_term=.4d269d250877 [https://perma.cc/WGK5-P7A6]. 
44. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. 
45. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). 
46. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
47. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 426–27 (1983) (citation 
omitted) (first quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961); then quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 169 
(Stewart, J., concurring)). 
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This was followed three years later by Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, in which the Court struck down as 
unconstitutional several state statutes it found to “intimidate women into 
continuing [their] pregnancies.”48  There the Court noted that “[c]lose analysis 
of those provisions, however, shows that they wholly subordinate constitutional 
privacy interests and concerns with maternal health in an effort to deter a 
woman from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make.”49  
However, three years later, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the 
Court raised for the first time a doubt about the trimester system holding 
constitutional a Missouri statute that not only prohibited the use of public 
facilities, public employees, or public funds in abortions, but also made a 
presumption that a twenty-week fetus was viable, suggesting that states could 
then offer protection.50  Thus, the question of when viability occurs and how 
changing medical technology might affect its occurrence becomes part of the 
discussion. 
The next major case to come before the Court was Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey in 1992.51  This was a case brought by 
abortion clinics and physicians challenging the constitutionality of five 
provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 198252:   
The Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her 
informed consent prior to the abortion procedure and specifies 
that she be provided with certain information [about abortion 
alternatives and government financial support] at least 24 
hours before the abortion is performed.  For a minor to obtain 
an abortion, the Act requires the informed consent of one of 
her parents, but provides for a judicial bypass option if the 
minor does not wish to or cannot obtain a parent’s consent.  
Another provision of the Act requires that, unless certain 
exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must 
sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband of 
her intended abortion.  The Act exempts compliance with these 
three requirements in the event of a “medical emergency,” 
which is defined in . . . the Act.  In addition of the above 
provisions regulating the performance of abortions, the Act 
 
48. 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986). 
49. Id. 
50. 492 U.S. 490, 501, 518-19 (1989) (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 188.029, .205, .210, .215 
(1986)).  
51. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
52. Id. at 844–45. 
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imposes certain reporting requirements on facilities that 
provide abortion services.53   
The Casey Court also considered whether Roe v. Wade might now be 
overruled.54  In a split decision, the Court held 
the rule of stare decisis . . . [requires that] the essential holding 
of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.   
 It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that Roe’s 
essential holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three parts.  
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to 
have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue 
interference from the State.  Before viability, the State’s 
interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of 
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the 
woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.  Second is a 
confirmation of the State’s power to restrict abortions after 
fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies 
which endanger the woman’s life or health.  And third is the 
principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset 
of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the 
life of the fetus that may become a child.55 
Nowhere did the Court question its earlier finding in Roe that “the unborn 
have never been recognized in the law as persons.”56  To the contrary, its 
reaffirming of the central holding in Roe would not have been possible had the 
Court intended to change its understanding of the fetus’s status.  Instead, what 
the Court did do was reject the trimester framework, because it did not consider 
it “to be part of the essential holding of Roe.”57  In effect, the Court was to now 
allow some state involvement in the previability pregnancy period, so long as 
it wouldn’t unduly burden a woman’s right to abortion.58  The Court found that 
[a] logical reading of the central holding in Roe itself, and a 
necessary reconciliation of the liberty of the woman and the 
interest of the State in promoting prenatal life, require, in our 
view, that we abandon the trimester framework as a rigid 
prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the 
 
53. Id. at 844 (citing Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203, 
3205, 3206, 3207(b), 3209, 3214(a), (f) (1992)). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 846. 
56. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
57. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873. 
58. See id. at 878. 
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protection of fetal life.59 
It should be noted that the rejection of the trimester system was not based 
on the fact that medical technological improvements might move back the point 
of viability, which the Court acknowledged was “an imprecision within 
tolerable limits given that the medical community and all those who must apply 
its discoveries will continue to explore the matter.”60  Moreover, the Court only 
treated the point of viability as the time when the state’s interest in protecting 
prenatal life might trump a woman’s right to an abortion, without ever saying 
exactly what that state interest might be.61   
In place of the trimester system, the Court employed an “undue burden 
analysis.”62  Under this test “a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect 
is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
before the fetus attains viability.”63  The Court then noted that 
[a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion 
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus.  A statute with this purpose is invalid 
because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in 
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free 
choice, not hinder it.  And a statute which, while furthering the 
interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has 
the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of 
serving its legitimate ends.64 
Afterwards, the Court went on to afford “[s]ome guiding principles” to 
govern how the undue burden test might actually operate in determining which 
state interests could be tolerated previability.65  Specifically, 
[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural 
mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a 
minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn 
are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the 
woman’s exercise of the right to choose.66 
 
59. Id. at 873. 
60. Id. at 870. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 878. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 877. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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The Court then applied the undue burden test to the Pennsylvania Abortion 
Control statute upholding each of its various restrictive provisions, except the 
requirement that “a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement 
indicating that she has notified her husband.”67  Regarding the other provisions 
at issue, the Court found that “[s]ince there is no evidence on this record that 
requiring a doctor to give the information as provided by the statute would 
amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an 
abortion, we conclude that it is not an undue burden.”68  And similarly, with 
regard to the twenty-four hour waiting period, the Court noted “[t]he idea that 
important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if they follow some 
period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable, particularly where the 
statute directs that important information become part of the background of the 
decision.”69  Although, the Court did acknowledge that the provision would 
likely raise the cost of abortion for poor persons who would presumably have 
to travel a second time to a clinic or obtain a hotel room if residing out-of-
town.70  The Court also dismissed the challenge to the parental consent 
requirement for minors that included a judicial override finding such 
requirements to be “based on the quite reasonable assumption that minors will 
benefit from consultation with their parents and that children will often not 
realize that their parents have their best interests at heart.”71  As mentioned, the 
only provision the Court struck was the spousal notification requirement noting 
that “there are millions of women in this country who are the victims of regular 
physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands.  Should these 
women become pregnant, they may have very good reasons for not wishing to 
inform their husbands of their decision to obtain an abortion.”72   
Justice Stevens filed a separate opinion partially concurring in affirming 
Roe and partially dissenting from the majority, taking particular aim at the 
twenty-four-hour waiting period, noting that “[a] burden may be ‘undue’ either 
because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a legitimate, rational 
justification,” suggesting that the information it was supposed to give attention 
to likely would already be known by the woman making the decision.73  Justice 
Blackmun similarly filed an opinion partially concurring and partially 
 
67. See id. at 844, 879, 898. 
68. Id. at 884-85. 
69. Id. at 885. 
70. Id. at 886. 
71. Id. at 895. 
72. Id. at 893. 
73. Id. at 911, 920 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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dissenting, in which he stated that “[a] State’s restrictions on a woman’s right 
to terminate her pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender 
equality.”74  Perhaps anticipating a personhood argument in a future case based 
on what was said by the dissent, Justice Blackmun also noted: “No Member of 
this Court—nor for that matter, the Solicitor General, has ever questioned our 
holding in Roe that an abortion is not ‘the termination of life entitled to 
Fourteenth Amendment protection.’”75 
In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia, and 
Thomas, wrote: “We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and 
should be overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare decisis 
in constitutional cases.”76  What is most interesting about Rehnquist’s dissent 
is his following statement: “One cannot ignore the fact that a woman is not 
isolated in her pregnancy, and that the decision to abort necessarily involves the 
destruction of a fetus.  Nor do the historical traditions of the American people 
support the view that the right to terminate one’s pregnancy is ‘fundamental.’”77  
The statement is interesting because its focus on the destruction of the fetus 
reveals that some members of the Court were coming to think of the fetus as 
possibly a person for Fourteenth Amendment protection, which would then 
nullify a woman’s right to choose, perhaps, even if her life were at risk. 
The net effect of the Court’s decision in Casey was to allow some state 
interference with a woman’s exercise of her right to choose an abortion 
previability, so long as it didn’t constitute an “undue burden on the right” 
itself.78  On its face, the decision appears benign.  However, because the Court 
never said exactly where the borders of the undue burden test lie, and given the 
regulations the Court allowed to stand,79 the test must be seen not only as being 
pretty vague and uncertain with no clear framework for guidance, but, even 
worse, as an open invitation to differing interpretations, which could seriously 
erode a woman’s right to access abortion, depending on how future Courts 
might view it, even absent any claim about the status of the fetus. 
The next case in the Court’s abortion-regulation precedent is Gonzales v. 
Carhart.80  This was a case brought by four physicians challenging the federal 
 
74. Id. at 922, 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
75. Id. at 932 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citation omitted) 
(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973)). 
76. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
77. Id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). 
78. Id. at 878. 
79. See id. at 879. 
80. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
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Partial–Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 that prohibited certain procedures that 
might be applied to late second-term abortions.81  “The Act proscribes a 
particular manner of ending fetal life” known as intact dilation and extraction, 
in which “the doctor extracts the fetus in a way conducive to pulling out its 
entire body, instead of ripping it apart.”82  It also “proscribes a method of 
abortion in which a fetus is killed just inches before completion of the birth 
process.”83  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, upheld the Act noting 
that Congress, in passing the Act, had stated as follows: “Implicitly approving 
such a brutal and inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will further 
coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and 
innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life.”84  
Kennedy also noted that “Congress was concerned, furthermore, with the 
effects on the medical community and on its reputation caused by the practice 
of partial-birth abortion.”85  Kennedy then went on to say that “[t]here is 
documented medical disagreement whether the Act’s prohibition would ever 
impose significant health risks on women.”86  That uncertainty, along with 
available alternatives to this procedure, Kennedy stated, “provides a sufficient 
basis to conclude in this facial attack that the Act does not impose an undue 
burden.”87  What Justice Kennedy did not say was that the procedure should be 
disallowed because of any status the Court was now willing to recognize as 
inherent in the fetus.88  Instead, he focused on how allowing this specific 
medical procedure may desensitize society to the basic human needs of its most 
vulnerable and innocent members,89 suggesting that his concern here was more 
with affirming the sanctity of human life and protecting the medical 
community’s reputation, rather than protection of the fetus as a person. 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a separate concurring 
opinion to reiterate his view that “the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, including 
[its decisions in] Casey and Roe v. Wade ha[d] no basis in the Constitution.”90  
 
81. Id. at 132–33, 135 (citing Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. 
IV 2004)). 
82. Id. at 134, 136-37; see 18 U.S.C. § 1531. 
83. 550 U.S. at 156-57; see 18 U.S.C. § 1531. 
84. 550 U.S. at 156–57 (citing Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 § 2). 
85. Id. at 157 (citing Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 § 2). 
86. Id. at 162. 
87. Id. at 164. 
88. See 550 U.S. 124.   
89. See id. at 157 (citing Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 § 2). 
90. Id. at 168–69 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer, in a strongly 
worded dissent, argued that the Court’s decision 
refuses to take Casey and Stenberg [v. Carhart] seriously.  It 
tolerates, indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban 
nationwide a procedure found necessary and proper in certain 
cases [to protect the health and well-being of the woman] by 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG).  It blurs the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between 
previability and postviability abortions.  And, for the first time 
since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no exception 
safeguarding a woman’s health. 91 
Finally, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Court considered, 
under the Casey undue burden standard, whether two provisions of a Texas law 
placed an undue burden on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion because the 
“‘purpose or effect’ of the provision ‘is to place a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.’”92  The 
two provisions at issue required (1) that “physician[s] performing or inducing 
an abortion . . . have active admitting privileges at a hospital that . . . is located 
not further than 30 miles from the location at which the abortion is performed 
or induced”93 and (2) that “an abortion facility must be equivalent to the 
minimum standards adopted under [the Texas Health and Safety Code section] 
for ambulatory surgical centers.”94 
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer stated: “We conclude that neither 
of these provisions confers medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens 
upon access that each imposes.  Each places a substantial obstacle in the path 
of women seeking a previability abortion, each constitutes an undue burden on 
abortion access.”95  What Justice Breyer was referring to was the district court 
 
91. Id. at 169-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that seven years earlier the Court had, in 
Stenberg v. Carhart, “invalidated a Nebraska statute criminalizing the performance of a medical 
procedure that, in the political arena, has been dubbed ‘partial-birth abortion.’” (quoting 530 U.S. 914 
(2000))).  Stenberg v. Carhart was a 5-4 decision holding that a Nebraska law that failed to provide an 
exception for threatened maternal health, and instead just criminalized partial birth abortions (where 
the unborn fetus is partially delivered into the vagina before being subject to a procedure that causes 
its death), violated the U.S. Constitution.  530 U.S. at 945-46. 
92. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) (quoting Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992)). 
93. Id. (final alteration in original) (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 171.0031(a) (West 2015)). 
94. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a)); see 
also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 243.010 (demonstrating the Texas Health and Safety Code 
minimum standards for ambulatory surgical centers). 
95. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.  
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findings “that ‘[t]he great weight of evidence demonstrates that, before the act’s 
passage, abortion in Texas was extremely safe with particularly low rates of 
serious complications and virtually no deaths occurring on account of the 
procedure.’”96  Justice Breyer then noted that the new rules forced the number 
of abortion facilities to be reduced from forty to twenty, effecting especially 
rural areas, establishing, as “the record evidence indicates[,] that the admitting-
privileges requirement places a ‘substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s 
choice.’”97  Regarding the surgical-center requirement, Justice Breyer said this 
offered “no benefit when complications arise in the context of an abortion 
produced through medication”;98 that Texas law allowed for midwives 
overseeing child birth that had “a mortality rate 10 times higher than an 
abortion”;99 that many of the “requirements [mandated by this provision] are 
inappropriate as applied to surgical abortions”;100 and “that ‘[m]any of the 
building standards mandated by the act and its implementing rules have such a 
tangential relationship to patient safety in the context of abortion as to be nearly 
arbitrary.’”101  A concurring opinion by Justice Ginsburg noted that, given the 
realities of the law’s requirements, “it is beyond rational belief that [the statute,] 
H.B. 2[,] could genuinely protect the health of women, and certain that the law 
‘would simply make it more difficult for them to obtain abortions.’”102  There 
were two dissents: the first by Justice Thomas, in which, after disagreeing with 
the Court’s application of the undue burden test, he stated, “I remain 
fundamentally opposed to the Court’s abortion jurisprudence”;103 the second by 
Justice Alito (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas), in which he 
challenged the Court’s failure to recognize that the case was barred for 
procedural reasons by res judicata.104 
Clearly, one conclusion that might be drawn from Whole Woman’s Health 
is the extent to which those opposed to abortion will go to prevent access to 
legal abortions.  If this and the prior case, Gonzales v. Carhart, signify that the 
 
96. Id. at 2311 (alteration in original) (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 
673, 684 (W.D. Tex. 2014)). 
97. Id. at 2302, 2312 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)). 
98. Id. at 2315. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 2316 (alteration in original) (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 
3d at 684). 
102. Id. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 
806 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
103. Id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
104. Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Court may be teetering between continuing a woman’s right to an abortion or 
taking it away, either by making it difficult to obtain or outright prohibiting it, 
then, obviously, any claim about the status of the fetus being a person under the 
Fourteenth Amendment could profoundly impact the future of the abortion 
right.  For this reason alone, one must take very seriously claims about what the 
proper status of the fetus is and, particularly, what is meant by personhood 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, not just as the law has stated it up to the 
present, but more generally how it should be understood in the future. 
III. DIFFERENT VIEWS ABOUT PERSONHOOD 
Professor Ronald Dworkin provides a valuable leadoff for a discussion of 
the abortion question that focuses on the personhood status of the fetus.105  In 
Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual 
Freedom, Dworkin states: 
[R]easonable-sounding proposals that the abortion issue 
should somehow be resolved by compromise seem unrealistic.  
For these proposals do not challenge the standard view of the 
character of the abortion argument—the standard view of what 
the argument is about—according to which the issue turns on 
what answer one gives to a polarizing question.  Is a fetus a 
helpless unborn child with rights and interests of its own from 
the moment of conception?106 
He then describes two very different ideas that might be meant when persons 
debating abortion use phrases such as “human life begins at conception,” “a 
fetus is a person from that moment,” and “abortion is murder or homicide or an 
assault on the sanctity of human life.”107   
 The first idea holds “that fetuses are creatures with interests of their own 
right from the start, including, preeminently, an interest in remaining alive, and 
that therefore they have the rights that all human beings have to protect these 
basic interests, including a right not to be killed.”108  For those who hold this 
view, “[a]bortion is wrong in principle” because it “violates someone’s right 
 
105. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, 
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993). 
106. Id. at 9. 
107. Id. at 11. 
108. Id. 
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not to be killed.”109  This seems to be the view that Justice Thomas ascribes 
to.110   
 The second idea claims 
that human life has an intrinsic, innate value; that human life is 
sacred just in itself; and that the sacred nature of a human life 
begins when its biological life begins, even before the creature 
whose life it is has movement or sensation or interests or rights 
of its own.111 
Those who hold this second idea, probably the late Justice Scalia, believe 
“abortion is wrong in principle because it disregards and insults the intrinsic 
value, the sacred character, of any stage or form of human life.”112 
The two ideas are different in that the former derives from rights all humans 
are thought to possess, whereas the latter represents a detached responsibility 
that government has to protect, namely, “the intrinsic value of life.”113  The 
distinction is helpful in that it focuses arguments about personhood on what 
kinds of grounds should be thought to be determinative.  However, this Author 
believes the distinction becomes problematic especially when, as with the 
second idea, it opens the door to basic rights being possibly affected by who 
has a majority of votes in the legislature.  In the first instance, the focus will be 
on the qualities or abilities possessed by the fetus.  In the second instance, it 
will be on the obligation of government to protect those values thought by a 
majority to be intrinsic.  Indeed, as Dworkin notes, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,114 exposed this second idea 
when he 
amplified the Missouri court’s claim about the sanctity of life: 
he said that Missouri, as a community, had legitimate reasons 
 
109. Id. 
110. See Laurence H. Tribe, Opinion, Clarence Thomas and ‘Natural Law,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 
15, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/15/opinion/clarence-thomas-and-natural-law.html 
[https://perma.cc/9Y75-MC3J]. 
111. DWORKIN, supra note 105, at 11. 
112. Id.  In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, Justice Scalia, writing in 
concurrence, stated:  
It is not even reasonable, much less required by the Constitution, to maintain that 
although the State has the right to prevent a person from slashing his wrists, it 
does not have the power to apply physical force to prevent him from doing so, 
nor the power, should he succeed, to apply, coercively if necessary, medical 
measures to stop the flow of blood. 
497 U.S. 261, 298 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
113. DWORKIN, supra note 105, at 11. 
114. 497 U.S. 261. 
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for keeping Nancy Cruzan alive, even on the assumption that 
remaining alive was against her own interests, because the state 
was entitled to say that it is intrinsically a bad thing when 
anyone dies deliberately and prematurely.115 
Dworkin then goes on to state that 
Justice Scalia, concurring, was even more explicit in stating 
that the intrinsic value of human life does not depend on any 
assumption about a patient’s rights or interests; states have the 
power, he said, to prevent the suicide of competent people who 
rightly think they would be better off dead, a power that plainly 
is not derived from any concern about their rights and 
interests.116 
This second idea provides an incredible perspective for it suggests that the 
obviously important status of being a person under the law is one that the states, 
and presumably the federal Congress, can construct and, if so, deconstruct at 
will.  Surely the states and Congress have authority under the Constitution to 
protect objects they deem to be of value.  However, to assign that authority to 
include personhood seems potentially very dangerous even from the point of 
view of those who would seek to guarantee the sanctity of unborn life, since the 
states’ authority even when exercised would not be constitutionally 
mandated.117  Indeed, even if society in general upholds the sanctity of human 
life as the antecedent to an assertoric hypothetical imperative governing what it 
should do, this would still only afford the unborn fetus protection (insofar as it 
is acknowledged as a person) merely a contingent value, to be altered whenever 
the current majority’s preferences change.118  Nor would Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (which states that “[t]he Congress shall have power to 
 
115. DWORKIN, supra note 105, at 12; see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. 
116. DWORKIN, supra note 105, at 12; see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
117. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 419-20 (3d 
ed. 2006).  For example, the third clause of Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution allows 
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  This means that “[i]f Congress has legislated, 
the question is whether the federal law preempts the state or local law . . . .  Even if Congress has not 
acted or no preemption is found, the state or local law can be challenged on ground that it excessively 
burdens commerce among the states.”  CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 419.  Justice Frankfurter explains that 
the doctrine “by its own force and without national legislation, puts it into the power of the Court to 
place limits on state authority.”  Id. at 419-20 (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY & WAITE 18 (1937)). 
118. Here follows Immanuel Kant’s description of what would constitute an assertoric 
hypothetical imperative and why such an imperative ought not to be the basis of a moral principle.  See 
IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS: AND WHAT IS 
ENLIGHTENMENT? 31–32 (Lewis White Beck trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc. 1959) (1785). 
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enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article”) provide this 
conclusion any greater legitimacy.119  For as the Court has already stated: 
Congress cannot change the substantive meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protections merely by acting under the enforcement provision of 
Section 5.120  Neither would Congress’s attempt to do so address the real 
question: Should a fetus be thought of as a person or not?  That question can 
only be decided on grounds that go to what the fetus is.  Thus, the second idea 
seems even more precarious than the first since it leaves it to the state to decide, 
by whatever popular position the society or those in the legislature currently 
hold, what protection the fetus is afforded, and that would afford the fetus no 
great protection at all, as it would reduce a “constitutional right” (“a woman’s 
right to an abortion”) to just being another instance of majoritarian rule.  Either 
the fetus is a person based on grounds of its own nature that can be readily 
assessed within the best understanding of personhood that can be developed, or 
it is not.  Especially since there is no doubt that a pregnant woman is a person, 
this would seem to be the profoundly more important question to ask, since its 
answer clearly implicates the rights of women. 
Turning to the first idea that the fetus is a person, Dworkin points out that 
“familiar questions about when life begins and whether a fetus is a person are 
not simply but multiply ambiguous.”121  He goes on to note that “[s]cientists 
disagree about exactly when biological life of any animal begins, but it seems 
undeniable that a human embryo is an identifiable living organism at least by 
the time it is implanted in the womb, which is approximately fourteen days after 
its conception.”122  But this view only further begs the question of whether the 
fetus is a person. 
Historically, in religious thought, “[t]he traditional Jewish view on abortion 
does not fit conveniently into any of the major ‘camps’ [pro-life or pro-choice] 
in the current American abortion debate—Judaism neither bans abortion 
 
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
120. In City of Boerne v. Flores, Justice Kennedy wrote: 
Congress’ power under [Section] 5, however, extends only to ‘enforc[ing]’ the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court has described this power as 
‘remedial.’  The design of the Amendment and the text of [Section] 5 are 
inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the 
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States. 
521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
121. DWORKIN, supra note 105, at 21. 
122. Id. 
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completely nor does it allow indiscriminate abortion.”123  “In talmudic times, 
as in ancient halakhah, abortion was not considered a transgression unless the 
fetus was viable.”124  However, this view may not be monolithic.  “The Zohar 
explains that the basis of the prohibition against abortion is that ‘a person who 
kills the fetus in his wife’s womb desecrates that which was built by the Holy 
One and His craftsmanship.’”125  So, God’s craftsmanship rather than the nature 
of the fetus itself seems to be the determining factor here.  Moreover, other 
views within the tradition would seem to allow abortion only “if the fetus 
endangers the mother’s life,” but here too, the issue of what should constitute 
an endangerment is not so clear and may be constrained depending upon 
whether the fetus has emerged from the womb into the world or may be a 
product of an adulterous union or would be a bastardous offspring.126  In Islam 
the fetus is not considered to be a living soul “before the foetus is 120 days 
old,” roughly four months after gestation, and abortion is only allowed before 
that time to save the mother’s life; otherwise, abortion is not allowed.127  “The 
Qur’an teaches that on the Day of Judgement parents who killed their children 
will be under trial for that crime, and their children will be witnesses against 
them.”128 
Interestingly, the Catholic church’s position on this issue also seems to have 
changed or, at least, been seriously nuanced over the centuries: 
Many early Church leaders and publications, such as the 
Didache, Tertullian, Athenagoras, Basil the Great, and others, 
also indicated that quickening was not used to determine the 
value of life in the womb.  Later Catholic theologians, leaning 
heavily on Greek philosophers like Aristotle, declared a 
distinction in the severity of the crime of procured abortion 
 
123. Issues in Jewish Ethics: Abortion, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY: A PROJECT OF AICE, 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/abortion-in-judaism [https://perma.cc/64MB-VM77] (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2017). 
124. Id. (citation omitted). 
125. Id.  Sometimes religious conservatives misquote scripture “to suggest that fetuses have full 
human status.”  JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 58 (Cynthia Ward et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 1993).  For example, in “the first chapter of Jeremiah . . . God is quoted as saying: ‘Before 
I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you.’”  Id. (quoting 
Jeremiah 1:5).  The passage, according to James Rachels is meant to assert Jeremiah’s authority to 
speak as a prophet, not to sanctify the unborn.  See id.   
126. See Issues in Jewish Ethics: Abortion, supra note 123. 
127. What Does Islam Say About Abortion?, ISLAMCAN.COM, 
http://www.islamcan.com/common-questions-about-islam/what-does-islam-say-about-abortion.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/8VH4-K2VE] (last visited Oct. 30, 2017). 
128. Id. (citing Qur’an 81:8-9). 
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based on a particular point in development.  Indeed, St. 
Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas both cited a point after 
conception, generally the point of quickening, as the moment 
at which the life in the womb becomes human, meaning 
ensouled with a rational human soul.  For Augustine and 
Aquinas, intentional abortion was always an offense against 
God but after the point of ensoulment it was much more so.  
These and other Church theologians often declared that 
abortion after quickening was a highly immoral action, worthy 
of immediate excommunication and/or the legal penalty for 
homicide.129 
Indeed, it wasn’t until the seventeenth century that the Church adopted its 
current conservative view “that the fetus is a human being from the moment of 
conception”; prior to that time, the Church accorded with the view of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, who, following Aristotle, held that an embryo is not ensouled 
“until several weeks into the pregnancy” when “the soul is the ‘substantial 
form’ of man”; that is, “has a recognizably human shape.”130  At the Council of 
Vienne in 1312, for example, the Church “officially accepted” Aquinas’s 
“rational or intellectual soul” as “essentially the form of the human body,” and 
“to this day it has never been officially repudiated.”131 
 
129. Katherine Brind’Amour, Roman Catholic Church Quickening, THE EMBRYO PROJECT 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Nov. 11, 2007), http://embryo.asu.edu/pages/roman-catholic-church-quickening 
[https://perma.cc/LVT9-ZHB4]; see Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the 
Dignity of Procreation Replies to Certain Questions of the Day, VATICAN (Feb. 22, 1987), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_r
espect-for-human-life_en.html [https://perma.cc/HTY7-57KB] (stating the fetus is “a person” with a 
“right to life and physical integrity from the moment of conception until death”).  Dworkin points out 
that “most American Catholics do not seem to accept that view, and it has been the clear official view 
of the church itself for little more than a century, a fraction of Catholicism’s long 
history. . . . [N]ot . . . that the church ever sanctioned early abortions.”  DWORKIN, supra note 105, at 
39.  Cf. John Garvey, Orthodox Christians and Abortion, ORTHODOX CHURCH IN AMERICA (Jan. 18, 
2013), https://oca.org/the-hub/the-church-on-current-issues/orthodox-christians-and-abortion 
[https://perma.cc/T4E3-AK2A] (arguing that although some Christian theologians made these 
distinctions, “they were never understood as offering permission for early abortions”). 
130. RACHELS, supra note 125, at 57, 59-60; see also DWORKIN, supra note 105, at 40-41. 
131. RACHELS, supra note 125, at 59-60; see also Council of Vienne 1311-1312 A.D., PAPAL 
ENCYCLICALS ONLINE, http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Councils/ecum15.htm#can1 
[https://perma.cc/WV5N-JCM4] (last updated Feb. 20, 2017).  More generally, Rachels notes that 
[t]he Christian tradition may be ambiguous about a specific issue; within the 
tradition, there may be elements that support both sides.  But because a particular 
believer feels so strongly about the issue, he or she will emphasize the elements 
of the tradition that support the favored moral view, while ignoring its other 
elements.  Then, without quite realizing what has happened, he or she will 
conclude, quite sincerely, that Christianity mandates the favored moral position. 
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Other religions, including other Christian denominations, hold varying 
views on abortion, based on scripture or church teachings, that straddle 
Dworkin’s distinction between personhood and sacredness of life: more 
conservative anti-abortion views are held by the Church of Jesus of the Latter 
Day Saints, the National Association of Evangelicals, Southern Baptists, and 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, who believe abortion is wrong except to save 
the life of the mother; more liberal views are followed by the Episcopal Church, 
the Presbyterian Church, United Church of Christ, and the Unitarian 
Universalist Association of Congregations, who tend more toward the matter 
being a woman’s choice; in the middle are the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America and the United Methodist Church, who take into account fetal 
abnormalities that might affect the unborn and the presence of proper medical 
procedures respectively.132  Hinduism is generally against abortion unless a 
woman’s health is at risk; Buddhism has no official position, “although many 
Buddhists believe life begins at conception and that killing is morally 
wrong.”133 
What is clear from these varied accounts from the different religious 
traditions, as well as the various differences within each tradition, is that the 
dominant factor at work is the presently existing values held central by the 
particular religious tradition that determine what factors are relevant and why.  
This is also why these varying views should be seen as religious and not strictly 
biological or in any cross-cultural sense as moral; for, as Dworkin explains, 
it does not follow from those facts that a fetus also has rights 
or interests of the kind that government might have a derivative 
responsibility to protect.  That is plainly a further question, and 
it is in large part a moral rather than a biological one.  Nor does 
it follow that a fetus already embodies an intrinsic value that 
government might claim a detached responsibility to guard.  
That is also a different question, and also a moral rather than a 
biological one.134   
Additionally, there may be situations where even religious institutions like 
the Catholic church acknowledge that there are times when it is morally 
 
RACHELS, supra note 125, at 57; see also Council of Vienne 1311-1312 A.D., supra. 
132. See Religious Groups’ Official Positions on Abortion, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 16, 
2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/01/16/religious-groups-official-positions-on-abortion/ 
[https://perma.cc/XB8E-3SRH]; see also DWORKIN, supra note 105, at 38 (“Some conservative 
theologians and religious leaders have also explicitly said that the crucial question about abortion is 
not whether a fetus is a person but how best to respect the intrinsic value of human life.”). 
133. See Religious Groups’ Official Positions on Abortion, supra note 132. 
134. DWORKIN, supra note 105, at 22. 
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permissible to allow a fetus to die by extraction, but do not call those extractions 
“abortion,” provided the intent was not to kill the fetus, even though that would 
be known to be the likely result.135  For example, under the Doctrine of Double 
Effect, 
[a] doctor who believed that abortion was wrong, even in order 
to save the mother’s life, might nevertheless consistently 
believe that it would be permissible to perform a hysterectomy 
on a pregnant woman with cancer.  In carrying out the 
hysterectomy, the doctor would aim to save the woman’s life 
while merely foreseeing the death of the fetus.  Performing an 
abortion, by contrast, would involve intending to kill the fetus 
as a means to saving the mother.136 
Here, it is important to note that what is doing the moral work in this 
decision is not any claim about the status of the fetus, but the intention the 
doctor has in performing the hysterectomy, which is to save the woman’s life.  
The mere consequence that follows removing a cancerous womb carrying an 
embryo plays no significant role in the morality of the choice, provided also 
that the result is proportional: life for life.137  In contrast, that same intention to 
save the woman’s life would not, under the Doctrine, justify an intention to kill 
the fetus, even if necessary to save the life of the mother.138  For then the good 
effect would be produced by the willed bad effect and not just as an incidental 
result of the bad effect’s occurrence.  What fails to get resolved by this 
approach, however, is why it should be thought wrong to intentionally kill a 
previable fetus in the first place.  That is something produced not by the 
Doctrine, but by the background moral views already upheld by the religion.  
In Catholicism, this is set by an Aquinian Natural Law tradition in which 
innocent existence must be protected since everything that naturally exists is 
thought to serve some moral purpose.139  In other words, if one doesn’t already 
 
135. See Doctrine of Double Effect, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ [https://perma.cc/7TRB-GLYA] (last updated Sept. 
23, 2014). 
136. Id. 
137. See id. 
138. See id. 
139. See RACHELS, supra note 125, at 52.  “The theory rests upon a certain view of what the 
world is like.  The natural world is not regarded merely as a realm of facts, devoid of value and purpose.  
Instead, the world is conceived to be a rational order with values and purposes built into its very 
nature.”  Id. at 50.  Thus, the view expresses a conception of the world, founded to some extent in 
Aristotle, in which “[t]he ‘natural laws’ that specify what we should do are laws of reason, which we 
are able to grasp because God has made us rational beings.”  Id. at 51, 53.  For a discussion of how 
Natural Law might operate, see Joseph Bolin, Natural Law and Natural Inclinations, PATHS OF LOVE 
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uphold the values of the tradition that killing the fetus would be wrong because 
it is contrary to purposeful existence, perhaps because one believes existence 
expresses merely a non-purposeful evolutionary result of survivability in a 
particular niche, then one would not necessarily accept the Church’s conclusion 
that it is wrong to abort a fetus.140  So, two questions must be met.  First, what 
is so special about personhood itself that warrants its protection?  And second, 
who are the beings that should be thought to possess personhood?  Especially 
in a pluralist society of laws affording individual rights, where not all people 
share the same religious or particular moral points of view, these questions are 
especially pressing, as their answers are likely to affect the rights of other 
persons, namely, women. 
IV. THE NEED FOR AN EMPIRICALLY VERIFIABLE, CROSS-CULTURAL 
NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
It is true that the way the world is understood is always in terms of the 
concepts used to make sense of it.  The philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine 
says: 
We cannot strip away the conceptual trappings sentence by 
sentence and leave a description of the objective world; but we 
can investigate the world, and man as a part of it, and thus find 
out what cues he could have of what goes on around him. 
Subtracting his cues from his world view, we get man’s net 
contribution as the difference.  This difference marks the extent 
of man’s conceptual sovereignty—the domain within which he 
can revise theory while saving data.141 
Quine’s point is that human understanding will always be associated with some 
conceptual scheme brought to bear on whatever data it is considering, but that 
doesn’t mean there are no indications of what the understanding might itself be 
contributing to the data or of how its contribution might be better revised to 
provide a more satisfactory understanding of what is being considered.  This 
 
(Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.pathsoflove.com/blog/2010/04/natural-law-and-natural-inclinations/ 
[https://perma.cc/B2YJ-DYVR].  Whether, in fact, the way the world is (“laws of nature”) is just the 
way it is, or the way it must be (nomological necessity), represents a deep philosophical divide between 
Regularists and Necessitarians respectively.  See Norman Swartz, Laws of Nature, INTERNET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, www.iep.utm.edu/lawofnat/ [https://perma.cc/674Y-U3HN] (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2017). 
140. See generally What Does It Mean to Be Human: Introduction to Human Evolution, 
SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM OF NAT. HIST., http://humanorigins.si.edu/education/introduction-
human-evolution [https://perma.cc/QXS8-GX7A] (last updated May 24, 2017) (providing a short 
discussion of human evolution). 
141. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 5 (Leo L. Beranek et al. eds., 1960). 
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should be as true of one’s understanding of personhood as it is of anything else, 
especially if one’s understanding of personhood is in any way based on 
empirical criteria.   
Following in Quine’s wake along a related path, the philosopher Donald 
Davidson notes that “[w]hat matters, then, is not whether we can describe the 
data in a neutral, theory-free idiom; what matters is that there should be an 
ultimate source of evidence the character of which can be wholly specified 
without reference to what it is evidence for.”142  He goes on to write that “[i]f 
the ultimate evidence for our schemes and theories, the raw material on which 
they are based, is subjective . . . , then so is whatever is directly based on it: our 
beliefs, desires, intentions, and what we mean by our words.”143  Davidson’s 
point is to let go of the “[m]yth of the [s]ubjective,” the belief that all we know 
is just what is in our mind, in favor “of a common public world” in which “the 
very possibility of thought demands shared standards of truth and 
objectivity.”144 
The point of raising this line of thought here is to emphasize that one’s view 
of personhood, like one’s view of anything else, will, at least in part, be 
necessarily connected to one’s concepts and, in general, to the overall 
conceptual scheme or worldview one holds.  One cannot extract oneself from 
this, at least not completely.  So, it makes sense that one’s view of personhood 
may be related to his or her moral or religious beliefs about the human condition 
and its importance.  If these beliefs play an important part in one’s worldview, 
as would be suggested from the above cited religious traditions,145 then the 
religious and moral concepts of the tradition may very much bear on who is 
thought to be a person.  But here is also where personhood becomes 
problematic. 
The problem comes in when one’s view of personhood in a pluralistic 
society is based on a conceptual scheme or worldview adopted by a single, or 
very few, religious traditions, not shared by all members of the society.  For in 
that instance, the unique view of personhood will be used to assign moral 
significance and, perhaps with it, legal protections, notwithstanding that these 
same protections might harm other persons’ rights, who may not share the same 
 
142. DONALD DAVIDSON, SUBJECTIVE, INTERSUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE 42 (2001). 
143. Id. at 43. 
144. Id. at 51–52. 
145. See Issues in Jewish Ethics: Abortion, supra note 123; What Does Islam Say About 
Abortion?, supra note 127; Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of 
Procreation Replies to Certain Questions of the Day, supra note 129. 
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view.  This is why Justice Scalia’s view in Cruzan146 is so incredible: it implies 
that the way rights get legally recognized might be similar to who may receive 
government benefits, by a simple legislative majority sharing some similar 
point of view.147  Surely, if personhood is to be assigned the universality that 
pretty much all religious traditions claim for it, it can’t be limited to a simple 
majoritarian vote, for then it could not be guaranteed to have any long-lasting 
significance.  But neither can the rights of women who may seek an abortion 
be so limited either.  What is needed then, if personhood is to be afforded true 
universality, is a common understanding of what is at stake when the 
personhood label is used that crosses the various religious and moral traditions 
and can be readily ascertained.  But finding a common understanding will not 
be possible unless some part of that understanding also can be objectively 
verifiable, possessing, at least, some empirical content recognizable by norms 
of most traditions. 
Neither would a satisfactory understanding be discernable by just 
presupposing that any objective empirical content should suffice to resolve the 
issue.  Certainly, it is empirically verifiable that fetal cells have forty-six 
chromosomes (just like adult human cells) and that normal fetal matter, at a 
certain stage in its development, becomes animate—quickens.148  These 
identifications are all empirically verifiable and may have significance for 
particular traditions.  Still, the normative significance to be assigned any one of 
these features, if it is to be treated as a basis for Fourteenth Amendment 
protection, cannot be founded solely because it satisfies a particular religious 
framework.  Otherwise, the result could emerge that one or a few religious 
views could dominate over all others or no religion at all, in violation of the 
First Amendment Establishment clause.149  So, the problem isn’t to find just 
 
146. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292-98 (1990). 
147. See id. at 292–93. 
148. See Medical Genetics: How Chromosome Abnormalities Happen, U. OF ROCHESTER MED. 
CTR., 
https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/encyclopedia/content.aspx?ContentTypeID=90&ContentID=P02126 
[https://perma.cc/39NM-NJLH] (last visited Oct. 30, 2017); First Fetal Movement: Quickening, 
AMERICAN PREGNANCY ASSOCIATION, http://americanpregnancy.org/while-pregnant/first-fetal-
movement/ [https://perma.cc/9PT5-K4ZE] (last updated Sept. 2, 2016, 5:56 PM). 
149. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court ruled 
unconstitutional the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act that allowed 
the superintendent of public schools to reimburse salaries of teachers in parochial (mostly Catholic) 
schools who taught from public textbooks and used only public instructional materials.  403 U.S. 602, 
606-07 (1971).  The Court noted that 
the very restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a 
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any conceptual framework that can be empirically verified and isn’t internally 
inconsistent.  The problem is to find the normative framework capable of 
operating in a pluralistic society—which means across many different 
traditions—for guaranteeing fundamental rights.  Indeed, this is what Justice 
Stevens was pointing to in his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, a case that 
challenged whether a state can constitutionally criminalize adult consensual 
same-sex, noncommercial “sodomy” in private.150  
In that case, Justice Stevens wrote in dissent: “[T]he fact that the governing 
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is 
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither 
history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from 
constitutional attack.”151  Justice Kennedy would later say, in Lawrence v. 
Texas—a very similar case to Bowers v. Hardwick—that “Justice Stevens’ 
analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should 
control here.  Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct 
today.  It ought not to remain binding precedent.  Bowers v. Hardwick should 
be and now is overruled.”152 
Of course, Justice Stevens in his dissent was looking retrospectively at 
whether the state could criminally prohibit a certain kind of personal 
freedom.153  Here the question is prospectively whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in its protection of “persons,” might protect the unborn from any 
of various harms, including the harm of death associated with abortion.  Still, 
the issue is essentially the same.  Because protecting fetuses as persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment would undo a woman’s constitutional right to an 
abortion and probably lead to making those who perform abortions criminals, 
the fact that the concern here is prospective rather than retrospective is of no 
paramount significance.  It is essentially the same concern, as it involves a 
conflict with a right clearly held by a woman—to control her own body—
 
strictly nonideological role give rise to entanglements between church and state.  
The Pennsylvania statute, like that of Rhode Island, fosters this kind of 
relationship.  Reimbursement is not only limited to courses offered in the public 
schools and materials approved by state officials, but the statute excludes “any 
subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship 
of any sect.” 
Id. at 620–21.  By contrast, in Van Orden v. Perry, the Court let stand, as not an establishment violation, 
a display of the Ten Commandments on Texas State Capitol grounds consistent with the country’s 
long-standing history dating back to 1789.  545 U.S. 677, 686, 691-92 (2005).   
150. 478 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
151. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
152. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
153. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218–19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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juxtaposed against a supposed right of a fetus to continue to term.  So, the 
question that must be met before this conflict can be resolved is what possible 
interpretation of what it means to be a person could possibly serve to clarify the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning of who to count as persons, while at the 
same time being sufficiently broad to not just be founded upon the 
understandings of one or even a few religious or moral traditions within a 
pluralistic society.  What is being looked for here is a specifically normative 
conception of personhood that could cross different traditions containing 
incommensurably different moral or religious doctrines, even if it may not 
provide a fully satisfactory solution within any one tradition.  The reason for 
searching out a cross-cultural conception and not just arbitrarily setting out a 
definition for ‘personhood’ is to acknowledge that with it will be accompanied 
rights and protections that otherwise would not be the case.154  This is a point 
the philosopher John Rawls makes when he argues for a cross-cultural, political 
conception of justice for a pluralistic society, to avoid running into 
incommensurable, comprehensive doctrines of a moral, religious or 
metaphysical nature that not all will agree with.155  
 
154. Here this Author follows an idea from John Rawls and H. L. A. Hart concerning the 
distinction between a concept and a conception.  Rawls writes in A Theory of Justice: 
Men disagree about which principles should define the basic terms of their 
association.  Yet we may still say, despite this disagreement, that they each have 
a conception of justice.  That is, they understand the need for, and they are 
prepared to affirm, a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and 
duties and for determining what they take to be the proper distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation.  Thus it seems natural to think of the 
concept of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice and as being 
specified by the role which these different sets of principles, these different 
conceptions, have in common. 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (1971).  Rawls’s point is to distinguish how one might 
recognize that what is being talked about is justice, because it involves (borrowing from Plato) “treating 
like cases alike” or “rendering to each his due,” from how one determines what is one’s due and when 
two cases should be thought alike.  See id.; see also PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 6 (A. D. Lindsay 
trans., E. P. Dutton & Co. 1957) (4th Century B.C.)). 
155. Rawls argues: 
[G]iven the fact of reasonable pluralism, what the work of reconciliation by 
public reason does, thus enabling us to avoid reliance on general and 
comprehensive doctrines, is two things: first, it identifies the fundamental role of 
political values in expressing the terms of fair social cooperation consistent with 
mutual respect between citizens regarded as free and equal; and second, it 
uncovers a sufficiently inclusive concordant fit among political and other values 
seen in a reasonable overlapping consensus. 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 157-58 (1993).  Challenging this notion of Rawls, the 
philosopher Robert George argues that “Rawls’s strategy is not to deny the truth of the claims of 
rationalist believers, but merely to deny that their claims ‘can be publicly and fully established by 
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Thus, in searching for a conception of personhood, one wants a normative 
criterion that is both able to cross different moral traditions and empirically 
verifiable.  Such a conception should certainly include a view of moral agency 
as founded within any moral tradition by virtue of its simply being 
prescriptive.156  Specifically excluded from this requirement are any additional 
features—beyond this thin view of prescriptiveness—which might be too 
closely associated with particular religious traditions that the First Amendment 
Establishment clause cannot give cognizance to because the features 
themselves are not established independently of the religious framework in 
which they are a part.157  
Perhaps since Kant, if not Plato, most philosophers have focused their 
attention on the actions of a “conscientious moral agent,” as “someone who is 
concerned impartially with the interests of everyone affected by what he or she 
does; who carefully sifts facts and examines their implications; who accepts 
principles of conduct only after scrutinizing them to make sure they are sound; 
who is willing to ‘listen to reason’ even when it means that his or her earlier 
convictions may have to be revised; and who, finally, is willing to act on the 
results of this deliberation.”158  At a minimum, this presupposes a capacity for 
 
reason.’”  Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106 
YALE L.J. 2475, 2483-84 (1997) (quoting RAWLS, supra, at 153).  George later goes on to ask, 
specifically in context to the abortion debate, how one might conclude that a woman has 
“a duly qualified right to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy” . . . without 
appeal to moral or metaphysical views widely in dispute about the status of 
embryonic and fetal human beings, or the justice or injustice of choices either to 
bring about their deaths or to perform acts with the foreseeable side effect of 
bringing about their deaths? 
Id. at 2487-88 (quoting RAWLS, supra, at 243 n.32).  Perhaps the apex of George’s arguments 
persuadably lies at the point where public reason appears unable to more than sidestep deeply founded 
moral debates, such as abortion and homosexuality, as simply being too difficult for what reasonable 
pluralism can resolve.  If so, then that same persuasiveness dissolves at the point where the use of 
public reason is directed, as it is here, towards objectively uncovering, at the core of such debates, a 
moral understanding for the concept of person itself.  While such an understanding may not offset a 
steadfast commitment to particular religious or moral doctrines, it should nevertheless afford the 
realization that public reason has gone as far as it possibly can to recognize the legitimacy of different 
points of view within a pluralistic society.   
156. See generally Moral Responsibility, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/AN35-DN8P] (last updated 
Mar. 26, 2014). 
157. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .”). 
158. RACHELS, supra note 125, at 13–14.  Immanuel Kant states in his first version of the 
“categorical imperative” that every rational being ought to “[a]ct only according to that maxim 
[personal rule of behavior] by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
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normative deliberation combined with a willingness to search for the truth.  
What more may be presupposed will likely depend from where a person is 
coming and the kind of society the decision will affect.  Some other utilitarian 
philosophers, notably Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Peter Singer, 
have a different understanding.  For them, “[a]ll that matters is whether [the 
individual] is capable of experiencing happiness and unhappiness—pleasure 
and pain.  If an individual is capable of suffering, then we have a duty to take 
that into account when we are deciding what to do, even if the individual in 
question is nonhuman.”159  The importance of this latter understanding goes to 
some of the claims raised by those who believe abortion is immoral if the fetus 
can feel pain.160  However, the utilitarian view is certainly not the standard view 
of philosophers concerned with moral agency, as it focuses on the consequences 
of pain and pleasure, rather than the status of persons.  Moreover, as will be 
described below, not all pains may be undesirable.161  Consequently, this 
utilitarian view shall be afforded attention in the final section where the issue 
of pain is considered as a possible limitation to the argument offered below.  In 
the meantime, the conception of personhood that can operate in a pluralistic 
society that also takes account of what makes one a moral agent must now be 
found. 
 
law,” implying that morality presupposes human autonomy, even if such autonomy (such freedom of 
the will) cannot be shown by way of sensation.  KANT, supra note 118, at 39, 170–72.  Plato, in a 
famous dialogue in The Republic, asks whether one who borrowed weapons should return them if the 
person from whom the weapons were borrowed has since gone mad, suggesting that the use of reason 
may involve a greater responsibility in determining how one should act than would simply follow 
fulfilling a prima facie obligation.  PLATO, supra note 154, at 6.  
159. RACHELS, supra note 125, at 97–100; JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 311 (1876); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 16 (2d 
ed. 1864); PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 45 (2d ed. 1990). 
160. Holly K. Michels, Bill Says Fetuses Can Feel Pain, Outlaws Abortion After 20 Weeks, 
BILLINGS GAZETTE (March 13, 2017), http://billingsgazette.com/news/government-and-politics/bill-
says-fetuses-can-feel-pain-outlaws-abortion-after-weeks/article_78ffd2c2-fc19-5644-939c-
f3012a0a27a0.html [https://perma.cc/V3YP-Z39W]. 
161. The philosopher Peter Singer describes what he calls “speciesism” as “a prejudice or 
attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members 
of other species.”  SINGER, supra note 159, at 6.  Singer goes on to say that “[t]he capacity for suffering 
and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we 
can speak of interests in a meaningful way.”  Id. at 7.  Singer notes that “[n]early all the external signs 
that lead us to infer pain in other humans can be seen in other species, especially the species most 
closely related to us—the species of mammals and birds.”  Id. at 11.  “[T]wo central illustrations of 
speciesism in practice” are taxpayer supported “experimentation on animals” for medical and cosmetic 
purposes, and “rearing animals for food.”  Id. at 22.  He goes on to state: “To stop them we must change 
the policies of our government, and we must change our own lives, to the extent of changing our diet.”  
Id. at 23. 
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V. PERSONHOOD AS VOLUNTARY PURPOSIVE AGENCY 
In his book, Reason and Morality,162 Professor Alan Gewirth argues for 
recognition of the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC)—Gewirth’s 
supreme principle of morality—as 
an egalitarian universalist moral principle . . . [that] says to 
every [moral] agent that just as, in acting, he necessarily 
manifests or embodies the generic features of action—
voluntariness and purposiveness—and necessarily claims the 
generic goods [of freedom and well-being] as his rights, so he 
ought to accept that his recipients, too, should manifest or 
embody these same generic features and have these same 
generic goods as their rights.163 
Although Gewirth’s goal is the establishment of a universal moral 
egalitarian principle rather than a specifically legal one, insofar as the Due 
Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment would 
afford many of the rights,164 it is helpful to show how his system clarifies the 
personhood concerns involved in the abortion decision. 
Of specific merit is Gewirth’s focus on human agency as embodying two 
important facets of personhood relevant to the abortion debate.  First, the 
generic features of voluntariness and purposiveness of human agency are 
themselves something every moral theory, by virtue of being prescriptive, 
necessarily presupposes and thus should certainly be part of any Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis by virtue of it also being prescriptive.165  Second, these 
 
162. ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978). 
163. Id. at 140. 
164. “The Supreme Court has held that some liberties are so important that they are deemed to 
be ‘fundamental rights’ and that generally the government cannot infringe upon them unless strict 
scrutiny is met.”  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 117, at 792.  The rights include “rights protecting family 
autonomy, procreation, sexual activity and sexual orientation, medical care decision making, travel, 
voting, and access to the courts.”  Id.  Professor Chemerinsky says, “[a]lmost all of these rights have 
been protected by the Court under the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment and/or the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 792-93.  
More recently, the Court added same-sex marriage to the list protected by the Due Process Clauses 
with aid from the Equal Protection Clause.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 
(2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-2605 (2015).  This Author has written an earlier, 
now somewhat dated in the American context, discussion of how Gewirth’s Principle of Generic 
Consistency, his universal moral egalitarian principle, would provide both a rational grounding for 
many of the rights found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations 
in 1948, as well as a means for interpreting and rationally justifying rights that should be protected by 
the U.S. Constitution.  See Vincent J. Samar, Gay-Rights as a Particular Instantiation of Human 
Rights, 64 ALB. L. REV. 983, 1001-29 (2001). 
165. See GEWIRTH, supra note 162, at 30.  Gewirth writes, 
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same features also fit neatly into the intuitive, self-referential idea of the “I” as 
subject that is consistent with a Kantian first-person perspective in which Kant 
affirms a principle of humanity and a meaningful sense for human 
responsibility.166  Gewirth describes voluntariness and purposiveness as 
follows: 
Voluntariness involves a procedural aspect of actions in that it 
concerns the way actions are controlled as ongoing events.  
Purposiveness, on the other hand, in addition to having the 
distinct procedural aspect . . . also involves the substantive 
aspect of actions, the specific contents of these events.  
Voluntariness refers to the means, purposiveness to the end; 
voluntariness comprises the agent’s causation of his action, 
whereas purposiveness comprises the object or goal of the 
action in the sense of the good he wants to achieve or have 
through this causation.167 
By focusing on human agency as opposed to mere biological existence, 
such as having forty-six chromosomes or the fetus having human form or 
having quickened, a bridge is created between humans as moral agents and their 
 
But however much the persons addressed by various moral and other practical 
precepts may differ in other respects, it is true of all of them that they are assumed 
to be able to control their relevant behaviors by their unforced choice for reasons 
and purposes they can make their own.   
Id.  This is a nontrivial point that should not be ignored simply because one adopts a particular moral 
stance on an issue.  For although various particularist moralities, especially those connected with 
specific religious doctrines, also might deem other criteria to be morally relevant, still they must all at 
least acknowledge that voluntariness and purposiveness provide a common denominator at the 
foundation of moral agency, necessary to its very existence.   
166. Kant writes: 
[W]e cannot conceive of a reason which consciously responds to a bidding from 
the outside with respect to its judgments, for then the subject would attribute the 
determination of its power of judgment not to reason but to an impulse.  Reason 
must regard itself as the author of its principles, independently of foreign 
influences; consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being, it 
must regard itself as free.  That is to say, the will of a rational being can be a will 
of its own only under the idea of freedom, and therefore in a practical point of 
view such a will must be ascribed to all rational beings. 
KANT, supra note 118, at 66-67.  In his book, The Big Picture, physicist Sean Carroll, who adopts the 
philosophical framework of poetic naturalism [belief in only one natural world which might be 
consistently described using different vocabularies] notes: “The hallmark of consciousness is an inner 
mental experience.  A dictionary definition might be something like ‘an awareness of one’s self, 
thoughts, and environment.’  The key is awareness: you exist, and the chair you’re sitting on exists, 
but you know you exist, while your chair presumably does not.”  SEAN CARROLL, THE BIG PICTURE: 
ON THE ORIGINS OF LIFE, MEANING, AND THE UNIVERSE ITSELF 3-4, 322 (2016). 
167. GEWIRTH, supra note 162, at 41. 
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biological selves.  In Kantian terms, by recognizing persons as ends in 
themselves, one acknowledges their inherent dignity as authors of their own 
actions, creators, at least in part, of their own lives.168  Here it is important to 
separate mere desire as the apparent operating factor in human choice, as might 
appear from within a third-person perspective, from the ability to deliberate on 
one’s desires, and to claim the ends of certain desires as one’s own.169  Humans 
care about what they do just because they care about themselves.170  This 
awareness of their own self-worth is what allows humans to adopt, from their 
own point of view, evaluative criteria for what they do whether that criteria is 
just egoistic or prospectively moral.171  It becomes part of their individual 
identities as they see what actions they undertake as affirming themselves and 
 
168. Kant writes: 
[R]ational nature exists as an end in itself.  Man necessarily thinks of his own 
existence in this way; thus far it is a subjective principle of human actions.  Also 
every other rational being thinks of his existence by means of the same rational 
ground which holds also for myself; thus it is at the same time an objective 
principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive 
all laws of the will.  The practical imperative [or Categorical Imperative in its 
second version], therefore, is the following: Act so that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as 
a means only.   
KANT, supra note 118, at 47 (footnote omitted).  The Estonian-Canadian psychologist, 
Endel Tulving, distinguishes “two different kinds of memory: semantic memory, which 
refers to general knowledge (Gettysburg was the site of an important battle in the American 
Civil War), and episodic memory, which captures our recollection of personal experiences 
(I visited Gettysburg when I was in high school).”  CARROLL, supra note 166, at 323 (citing 
Endel Tulving, Episodic Memory and Autonoesis: Uniquely Human? in THE MISSING LINK 
IN COGNITION: ORIGINS OF SELF-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 3, 13-16 (Herbert S. 
Terrence and Janet Metcalfe eds., 2005)).  The relevance is that “[t]here is some evidence 
that episodic memory doesn’t develop in children until they are about four years old, around 
the time they also seem to develop the capacity for modeling the mental states of other 
people.”  Id. at 325. 
169. Christine M. Korsgaard makes this point in The Sources of Normativity when she notes that 
“[t]he human mind is self-conscious,” such that 
we human animals turn our attention on to our perceptions and desires 
themselves, on to our own mental activities, and we are conscious of them.  That 
is why we can think about them.  And this sets us a problem no other animal 
has. . . .  Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason to act?  The reflective mind 
cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such.  It needs a reason. 
CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 92–93 (Onora O’Neill ed., 1996). 
170. Korsgaard states that the communitarian sees that “his particular ties and commitments will 
remain normative for him only if this more fundamental conception of his identity is one which he can 
see as normative as well.”  Id. at 119. 
171. See id. at 119–22. 
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who they are.172  Consequently, humans are valuable and warranting respect 
and dignity because anything they value begins from their prior valuation of 
themselves.173  They are persons because of their capacity to be a subject  of 
value, and not just an object of whatever desire may be strongest at any 
particular moment.174 
Still, if all that was being asserted here was a “transcendental” claim of 
human beings having the capacity to value, one might question how such a 
claim could ever be established, except perhaps anecdotally.175  What is 
valuable about the Gewirthian focus on voluntariness and purposiveness is its 
potential for being discoverable by external psychological evidence at least to 
the degree of credence that any mental state is objectively determinable by an 
agent’s words or deeds.176  In the case of children, as with adults, voluntariness 
and purposiveness are discovered by fashioning “a coherent plan of life.”177  In 
the case of the unborn fetus, voluntariness and purposiveness will not likely be 
discoverable for it is doubtful that these abilities will surface as their capacities 
are still in the developmental stage and the fetus is unlikely to display them.178   
The ability to ascertain voluntariness and purposiveness for children and 
adults is important because, no doubt, one of the attractions for describing 
personhood in terms of human biological existence is its ability to be readily 
 
172. See id. 
173. See id. 
174. See id.  Korsgaard writes:  
Much of our legal system, and much of the way we navigate the waters of our 
social environment, hinges on the idea that individuals are largely responsible for 
their actions. . . . [For example, even among those who question how deeply 
human freedom extends, such as] [p]oetic naturalists and other compatibilists 
[who find compatibility between underlining deterministic, impersonal scientific 
claims and the language “of choice and volition”] . . . have no difficulty in 
attributing responsibility or blame [at least not in the normal run-of-the-mill 
cases]. 
CARROLL, supra note 166, at 383. 
175. “Kant’s central argument for this view is the transcendental deduction, according to which 
it is a condition of self-consciousness that our understanding constructs experience in this way.”  
Immanuel Kant, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/#MorFre [https://perma.cc/W45J-2LXP] (last updated Jan. 25, 
2016). 
176. Gewirth notes that human beings’ autonomy necessary for rationality in a broad sense is 
able to set “laws for himself, or decide[] on his own principles of conduct,” even if “it may be based 
on a faulty use of reason, including false but corrigible beliefs or invalid inferences.”  GEWIRTH, supra 
note 162, at 138. 
177. Id. 
178. See id. at 120, 140. 
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ascertained with a high degree of credence.  Voluntariness and purposiveness 
also support affording a level of moral recognition to higher animals since many 
of these actually display more of the characteristics of human personhood, such 
as memory and behavioral reciprocity, than might be found even in very young 
infants or persons with serious mental challenges.179  Thus, the criteria of 
voluntariness and purposiveness together present the sought after standard for 
determining legal personhood, as the criteria afford a basis for determining who 
should count that is both consistent with longstanding Western moral tradition 
and is empirically ascertainable.180 
Assuming then that voluntariness and purposiveness are now to be 
considered a reliable benchmark for determining personhood, what limitations 
might this benchmark suggest?  Certainly, normal human adults who are asleep 
or in a temporary coma are still in an important way voluntary purposive agents, 
even though they may not be exercising actual agency at the moment or even 
impliedly claiming by their actions rights to freedom or well-being.181  The 
point is that such claims are to be understood as dispositional attributions 
arising from their own internal characteristics and not necessarily occurrent.182  
Such agents are prospective and, as such, deserving of the same respect as 
actual agents, for there is no fundamental distinction between them and actual 
 
179. See SINGER, supra note 159, at 19 (“We may legitimately hold that there are some features 
of certain beings that make their lives more valuable than those of other beings; but there will surely 
be some non-human animals whose lives, by any standards, are more valuable than the lives of some 
humans.  A chimpanzee, dog, or pig, for instance, will have a higher degree of self-awareness and a 
greater capacity for meaningful relations with others than a severely retarded infant or someone in a 
state of advanced senility.”); see also FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX 
AMONG APES 205–07 (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks 1989) (1982) (showing that Chimpanzees exhibit 
reciprocity in their response to being attacked even after several hours have passed along lines not too 
different from “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”). 
180. This discussion ignores the further question: Can certain nonliving beings, such as 
corporations, estates, or trusts, be persons in the sense described?  Here the range of nonliving actors 
is narrowed to leave conceptual space for future advances, as might be produced in the field of Artificial 
Intelligence.  Suffice to say, that in their regular operation, the specified nonliving institutions have 
been assigned the “legal fiction” person by various federal and state statutes.  See 34 AM. JUR. 1ST 
Limitation of Actions § 372 (1941).  The philosopher Peter French has argued that the term “moral 
person” might also apply to these same institutions, if the existence of their interests and decisions are 
not simply reducible to the interests or decisions of the individual shareholders, officers, or trustees.  
Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 207–15 (1979).  Of course, 
it will be a matter of controversy just how much voluntariness and purposiveness the specified 
nonliving institutions actually exhibit. 
181. See GEWIRTH, supra note 162, at 62. 
182. Id. 
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agents, except that, at the moment, they are not exercising their agency.183  
Certainly, one who assigns value to herself as agent would not want that value 
undercut simply because she fell asleep or was in a temporary coma.  What is 
more problematic concerns potential agents, such as fetuses, for example, who 
are not yet capable of being agents.  This is where the abortion issue requires 
careful attention if personhood is to be secured. 
Gewirth notes that a person is a full-fledged agent with all the rights to 
freedom and well-being when she can attain through her use of her own 
practical abilities those purposes she regards as good no matter how simple or 
complex her own purposes might be.184  So, a child, for example, may be 
required to hold a parent’s hand when crossing a street without demeaning the 
child’s personhood, since a child would not have relevant knowledge of street 
traffic to know how to safely navigate on its own; that is to say it is not yet a 
full-fledged agent.185  Similarly, persons suffering from dementia might have a 
guardian ad litem appointed by a court to aide them in conducting their own 
financial and personal affairs in order to avoid being defrauded or harmed.  In 
neither case are the persons being demeaned; rather, there is an empirically 
assessable recognition at work that allows, indeed requires, assistance for the 
conduct of their own affairs.186  The situation is different where no agent with 
purposes and abilities of his own is yet in existence but only in a state of 
becoming an agent, if left to continue to develop unimpeded.187  Here, the 
question of personhood is far more uncertain because the agency involved is 
only potential, not actual. 
Gewirth deals with this question in his moral theory specifically in the 
context to the abortion issue when he says that a potential agent like a fetus at 
a late stage of pregnancy may have more claim to being brought to term than at 
an earlier stage, but that in no event should such a claim trump a woman’s right 
to continue her personhood if her life or health is seriously threatened.188  Here 
it is important to understand that Gewirth’s argument is addressing the pregnant 
 
183. See id. at 140.  Gewirth states that “[t]he moral population or community to which the PGC 
applies comprises all prospective purposive agents.”  Id.   
184. See id. at 120, 141.  Here it should be noted that while “there are degrees of approach to 
being a prospective purposive agent, there are not degrees of actually being such an agent in the respect 
that is relevant to the justification of having the generic rights.”  Id. at 124. 
185. See id. at 120, 141. 
186. See id. at 120, 142. 
187. See id. at 142.  At the other end of life, one can imagine such agency as essentially 
extinguished when one falls into a persistent vegetative state with no hope of ever regaining 
consciousness.  See id. at 141-42; see also SAMAR, supra note 30, at 200. 
188. See GEWIRTH, supra note 162, at 143. 
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woman’s claim to discontinue a pregnancy, not the state’s claim to disallow 
abortion.189  For, prior to viability, the state’s interest could not be well-founded 
since the fetus’s value cannot be described in a nonquestion-begging way 
distinct from the value of the mother.190  However, this would not prevent the 
state from establishing criteria applicable throughout the pregnancy, as was 
suggested in Roe and Casey, to protect the health and well-being of pregnant 
women, since their value is always to be acknowledged.191  This follows from 
the recognition of the woman as a full-fledged agent with all the rights to 
freedom and well-being that go along with that full-fledged status.192 
Gewirth describes this situation with a “Principle of Proportionality,” 
according to which, if “the abilities to control one’s behavior by one’s unforced 
choice” vary in degree because they either have not yet developed or are 
deficient to carry out one’s purposes, then any claim arising from them against 
a full-fledged agent, who would have the rights in full, would need to be 
balanced.193  Gewirth analogizes this situation to a person approaching voting 
age, who does not yet have the right to vote but, nevertheless, with each passing 
year has a greater claim on her school or society to provide civics courses so 
she will understand the importance of the right (and how to exercise it) when 
she reaches voting age.194   
What is of paramount importance in the abortion debate then is locating not 
where the woman’s interests lie (which presumably would continue throughout 
the whole pregnancy) but locating specifically where the fetus’s interest (or 
more likely the society’s derivative interest as its protector) can be found to be 
sufficiently important to now play an independent and possibly governing role.  
On this point, Gewirth writes: 
it is also important to consider the relation between the 
mother’s generic rights and the prospects for the fetus’s 
development of the generic abilities required for purpose-
fulfillment. . . . [I]f there is no conflict of rights, then the fetus, 
because of its human potentialities, has such right to well-being 
as is required for developing its potentialities for growth 
toward purpose-fulfillment.  But the prospects for fulfilling 
this right are often meager when the mother’s physical, 
psychological, or social circumstances render her unable or 
 
189. See id. 
190. See id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
191. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). 
192. See GEWIRTH, supra note 162, at 142-44. 
193. See id. at 121-22. 
194. See id. 
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unwilling to give her baby the nurturing care it needs.  In such 
cases the mother’s rights to freedom and well-being are 
threatened and with them also the aforementioned right of the 
fetus.195 
Gewirth goes on to state that 
[i]t is vitally important that concern for the fetus’s right to life 
be matched by concern for its right to adequate nutrition and 
other components of basic well-being.  Too often the advocates 
of the former right show marked indifference to the latter.  
Where the prospects of fulfilling the latter right are poor, this 
fact, together with the fetus’s lack of practical abilities and 
purposes, may also justify abortion.196 
The point of viability—where the fetus can presumably live outside the 
womb—operates here to locate where the developing fetus’s interest lies (with 
society as its protector) and must now receive attention.197  Before that stage, 
society’s interest must be in service to that of the woman’s and should include 
information about her own health and well-being.  At the point of viability, 
however, the fetus’s “brain may have developed sufficiently so that [in addition 
to being able to live outside the womb] a primitive form of fetal sentience is 
possible.”198  This, in addition to any concern the state may have for promoting 
prenatal development, is where society’s concern for the fetus takes on a 
partially independent character.199  However, in no instance, even at this post-
viability stage, where society may set some standards for fetal survival, would 
society’s concern for the rights of the fetus ever equate or be comparable to the 
same rights of the woman, as would be the case if saving the life of the fetus 
would lead to death or serious physical or mental harm to the mother, for, as 
yet, the fetus is still not yet a person with purposes of its own.  As Gewirth 
describes the situation: 
The conflict involves that the mother’s generic rights to the use 
of the abilities required for purpose-fulfillment are threatened 
by the fetus’s being carried to full term.  With regard to well-
 
195. Id. at 143-44. 
196. Id. at 144. 
197. Gewirth notes that 
[i]f there were no conflict between the rights of the fetus and the rights of the 
mother, the Principle of Proportionality together with the PGC would require 
simply that the fetus, while of course having no right to freedom, have such right 
to well-being as is required for developing its potentialities for growth toward 
purpose-fulfillment. 
Id. at 142. 
198. DWORKIN, supra note 105, at 169. 
199. See infra Part VI. 
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being, the threat may be the mother’s death, or severe 
diminution of physical or mental health, or lesser but still 
sizable losses.  With regard to freedom, the threat may be a 
continuation of the kind of severe violence or coercion that 
occurs when impregnation is due to rape or seduction or other 
causes beyond the mother’s ability to control.  In all such cases, 
abortion is justified regardless of the fetus’s stage of 
development.  For the mother, as a purposive agent, already 
has the generic practical abilities and the purposes to which 
these are directed, and their being lost, endangered, or attacked 
for the sake of the fetus would involve that the generic rights 
of someone who has them in full would be drastically 
subordinated to a minimal possessor of these rights.200 
Now it should be noted that nothing in this analysis could be used to support 
infanticide.  That is because “the case of infants is different, for there is no 
comparable threat to the mother’s generic rights, and the infant already has its 
own desires and purposes stemming from its separate physical existence,” even 
if only rudimentarily.201  Additionally, recall that Dworkin identified as one 
idea for the persistence of the abortion debate that human life should be viewed 
as sacred; if this is so, then setting a fairly bright line at the point where the 
fetus becomes viable should support this view, provided maternal life or health 
not be seriously endangered.  And so, the fact that Roe had set, and Casey 
affirmed, viability as this important guidepost for where the fetus’s interest in 
being brought to term is afforded independent state attention is certainly 
consistent with Gewirth’s analysis of the rights involved.202 
VI. THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 
Earlier it was suggested that an alternative view of personhood that would 
be consistent with utilitarian views held by Bentham, Singer, and some others 
 
200. GEWIRTH, supra note 162, at 143.  But cf. Nathan Jun, Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism and 
Abortion: A Response, OHIO UNIVERSITY (June 27, 2009), https://www.ohio.edu/ethics/1999-
conferences/gewirths-ethical-rationalism-and-abortion-a-response/index.html [https://perma.cc/64FZ-
V4HM] (asserting three criticisms of Gewirth’s argument without offering, at least in this account, any 
supporting argument, including the criticism that Gewirth’s claim of no “comparable conflict” is 
unintelligible).  It appears that the author, Nathan Jun, may have misunderstood the significance 
Gewirth identifies with being a full-fledged agent as categorically different from being merely a 
potential agent, which possesses no voluntariness or purposiveness, and is also unlikely to be self-
aware. 
201. GEWIRTH, supra note 162, at 143. 
202. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992). 
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might encompass “[t]he capacity for suffering and enjoyment [as] a 
prerequisite for having interests at all.”203  If this view is to be seriously 
considered then an immediate concern arises for determining the stage of fetal 
development where the fetus might experience physical pain.  How should the 
law react to fetal pain?  First, it is important to note that the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, according to its spokesperson, Kate 
Connors, states: “The science shows that based on gestational age, the fetus is 
not capable of feeling pain until the third trimester.”204  If so, then the point at 
which the fetus might feel pain would occur after the point of viability.205  “New 
research confirmed that 22-week fetuses, measured from the first day of the 
pregnant woman’s last menstrual cycle [not from the date of conception as 
some have suggested], can survive [outside of the womb].206  Babies born 
before that age did not survive.”207  So, it would appear that the issue of sensing 
 
203. SINGER, supra note 159, at 7. 
204. Sara G. Miller, Do Fetuses Feel Pain? What the Science Says, LIVESCIENCE (May 17, 2016 
5:22 PM), http://www.livescience.com/54774-fetal-pain-anesthesia.html [https://perma.cc/Y32W-
DRFU].  See generally Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the 
Evidence, 294 JAMA 947, 950–952 (2005), http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/201429 
[https://perma.cc/73LA-YS4C] (explaining how the fetal nervous system develops). 
205. See Miller, supra note 204; see also Ye Hee Lee, supra note 43. 
206. Ye Hee Lee, supra note 43; see also Matthew A. Rysavy et al., Between-Hospital Variation 
in Treatment and Outcomes in Extremely Preterm Infants, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1801, 1802 (2015). 
207. Ye Hee Lee, supra note 43; see also Rysavy, supra note 206, at 1804 (explaining how 
different hospital practices account for different survival rates at 22, 23, and 24 weeks of gestation).  
Here it is important to also take account of potential future changes in medical technology that 
theoretically could push viability to a very early stage of pregnancy.  See, e.g., Adam Wishart, Are 
Doctors Defying Nature by Keeping Premature Babies Alive?, DAILY MAIL, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1364007/Are-doctors-defying-nature-keeping-premature-
babies-alive.html [https://perma.cc/HH9F-QNCT] (last updated Mar. 7, 2011, 8:19 PM).  While this 
was not a determining factor in Casey, see 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992), it could become a factor in the 
future, if the definition of viability were to be made to encompass all forms of medical procedures that 
might make a fetus survive outside the womb, regardless of its stage of development.  For this reason, 
it is important to be clear that such an approach could very seriously limit a woman’s right to control 
her own body, if the result of it were to force, what would otherwise be a previable birth.  The situation 
is not dissimilar from end of life decisions where a person decides, perhaps by a provision in a living 
will, not to extend life by extraordinary measures, as this is not considered euthanasia.  Mary Randolph, 
What is a Living Will?, ALLLAW, http://www.alllaw.com/articles/wills_and_trusts/article7.asp 
[https://perma.cc/29KY-7HXT] (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).  Since the law generally recognizes adult 
persons to have authority over their own bodies both in regard to end of life decisions, Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990), and by requiring consent before 
receiving most medical treatments, Understanding Informed Consent - A Primer, FINDLAW, 
http://healthcare.findlaw.com/patient-rights/understanding-informed-consent-a-primer.html 
[https://perma.cc/L9MX-FE4M] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017), these same requirements should be 
extended to a decision not to undergo a previable birth, when made in consultation with one’s 
physician.  See generally Richard J. Ackermann, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining 
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pain, even if it were thought to be part of personhood, would do little to alter 
the Roe finding that the state’s interest in prenatal life starts with viability.208 
Still, as the theory presented here focuses on voluntariness and 
purposiveness, which is not likely to occur before the time of birth, how should 
any prebirth sensation of pain affect what has been presented?  Stated another 
way, what legitimate requirements might the state impose to offset pain 
associated with a post-viable abortion performed to protect maternal health?  
Here, the philosopher Christine Korsgaard, in considering how pain might be 
an objection to focusing on conscious determinations of how to live, notes: 
Many pains are worth having; one may even say that they are 
true.  Pain is not the condition that is a reason to change your 
condition, the condition in which the natural and the normative 
are one.  It is our perception that we have a reason to change 
our condition.  Pain itself is not a reason at all.209 
That one may have a tooth ache doesn’t necessarily signal that one should pull 
out the tooth.  Rather, it operates as a call to investigate, to find a reason, for 
what should be done.  Korsgaard goes on to note that 
a living thing is a thing with a special kind of form.  A living 
thing is so designed as to maintain and reproduce itself.  It has 
what we might call a self-maintaining form.  So it is its own 
end; its job is just to keep on being what it is.  Its business in 
life is to preserve its own identity.  And its organs and activities 
are arranged to that end.210 
Korsgaard’s point here is to deny that when a living thing experiences the 
sensation of pain, as when it experiences the sensation of hunger, it perceives 
anything more than a threat to its identity to which it is biologically designed 
 
Treatment, AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN (Oct. 1, 2000), http://www.aafp.org/afp/2000/1001/p1555.html 
[https://perma.cc/6UYY-NMN5].  One could analogously say the decision to not engage extraordinary 
measures to birth an otherwise previable fetus is properly the woman’s decision, since following Roe 
and Casey, the developing fetus, at this point, is just a part of the woman’s body, with no independent 
personhood status of its own.  Additionally, there are serious concerns that arise from birthing previable 
fetuses, regarding both the survival of the fetus and its impact on the long-term health and well-being 
of the fetus and the woman.  See Periviable Birth, 130 OBSTETRIC CARE CONSENSUS 187, 188 (2017).  
Thus, the previable situation is in a significantly important way quite different from the postviable 
situation where the fetus has a heartbeat and could survive outside the womb, even if it should need 
the assistance of medical services to guarantee its survival, provided the mother’s health is not in 
jeopardy.  But even in the postviable situation, as this Article has argued and the case law has 
maintained, a serious health risk to the mother overrides any state interest in prenatal life. 
208. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
209. Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON 
HUMAN VALUES 21, 104 (Nov. 16–17, 1992). 
210. Korsgaard, supra note 169, at 149. 
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to revolt.211  This tendency to revolt, however, is different from that of a normal 
adult human who then evaluates the threat to determine a proper response.212  
As the latter suggests, “[o]bligation is the reflective rejection of a threat to 
[one’s] identity.  Pain is the unreflective rejection of a threat to your identity.  
So pain is the perception of a reason, and that is why it seems normative,” but 
it is not the reason that carries the response,213 for that needs reflection.   
Now consider the case even of an animal in pain: “An animal’s cries express 
pain, and they mean that there is a reason to change its condition.  And you can 
no more hear the cries of an animal as mere noise than you can the words of a 
person.”214  But they are not the reason, which may depend on what is causing 
the pain.  Persons have reasons to come to the aid of a dog or cat, or any animal 
in pain by determining its cause and what a proper response should be.  But 
how might this analysis now translate to a post-viable unborn fetus suffering 
the pain of abortion? 
Why not first start from the position of the pregnant woman as a full-fledged 
moral agent and then consider the position of the fetus if it is in pain?  From the 
woman’s point of view, she would rationally want to consider the level of fetal 
development: if before viability and pain is not yet present, then her pause for 
concern, like for killing any living thing—the fetus is living tissue after all—
would require her to have a reason for why she ought not to continue its 
development.  That reason need not represent any great difficulty she ought to 
endure, be it physical or mental, economic or situational, but it should at least 
represent a reason that would affirm why continuing the fetus to term would 
not be in her best interests, especially if she is far along in the pregnancy. 
By contrast, if the developmental point for fetal viability and pain reception 
have both already occurred, then the concern needs to be more than just how 
discontinuing the fetal development should benefit the woman’s interest 
including how it might affect her life prospects for a job or future family; at that 
point, the concern needs to also take into account the fact that fetal pain and the 
potential for life outside the womb is being discounted.  If the woman’s life or 
health is seriously threatened, then the abortion is certainly justified as she is a 
full-fledged agent whose right to life is being threatened.  But what about the 
pain issue?  Here her moral obligation and that of the states should be to offset 
any pain to be suffered by the fetus as much as possible without unreasonably 
endangering maternal health.  This might be accomplished by use of anesthesia, 
 
211. See id. at 149–50. 
212. See id. at 150.  
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 153.  
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provided it would not pose a health risk to the woman.215  For here the situation 
would involve a woman, who is a full-fledged voluntary purposive agent, 
surviving only because of the unfortunate consequence that a potential agent 
would not.  Similarly, were a woman to choose an induced labor, in order to 
maybe save the unborn’s life, the consideration there too should take into 
account her need to do what is necessary for her well-being, as well as whatever 
risk she might be willing to freely tolerate to bring the fetus preterm. 
Again, if the physical or mental danger to the woman is sufficiently grave, 
abortion, even post-viability, must be an option.  The approach must consider 
the whole picture of the woman’s needs as a full-fledged agent against that of 
the still developing but, as yet, only potential agency of the fetus.  As Singer 
points out with respect to humans in their relation to other species, “[i]t is not 
arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable of abstract thought, 
of planning for the future, of complex acts of communication, and so on, is 
more valuable than the life of a being without these capacities.”216  And this 
utilitarian stance takes on greater significance when one considers, not as a 
matter of utility but as a matter of rights, that what will be lost is, as yet, only a 
potential human agent.217 
 
215. Jeff Guo, Should We Give Fetuses Painkillers Before We Abort Them?, WASH. POST (Mar. 
26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/03/26/montana-lawmakers-
want-fetuses-to-be-anesthetized-before-theyre-aborted/?utm_term=.970297ed70da 
[https://perma.cc/UGQ5-CMLE]. 
216. SINGER, supra note 159, at 20. 
217. See Gewirth, supra note 162, at 140.  See generally Robert A. Montaña, The Gewirthian 
Ideal of Self-Fulfillment: Enhancing the Moral Foundations of International Law, in GEWIRTHIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 125, 127 (Per Bauhn ed., 2016).  An interesting question arises: 
Should a state be able to legally require a brain-dead pregnant woman to be kept alive in order to try 
to save the fetus?  This question received a fair amount of attention in 2014 when Marlise Muñoz, a 
33-year-old pregnant woman, was found to be brain-dead after collapsing on the kitchen floor at her 
home.  Manny Fernandez & Erik Eckholm, Pregnant, and Forced to Stay on Life Support, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/us/pregnant-and-forced-to-stay-on-life-
support.html [https://perma.cc/TEL5-FCGR].  When Marlise Muñoz was declared brain dead, she was 
14 weeks pregnant.  Id.  Her husband and parents both asked the treating doctors at John Peter Smith 
Hospital in Fort Worth, Texas, to remove Marlise from life-support, but the doctors told the mother 
that they would not make that decision until the fetus reached 22 to 24 weeks.  Id.  This was to comply 
with a Texas statute, which “states that a person may not withdraw or withhold ‘life-sustaining 
treatment’ from a pregnant patient.”  Id.; see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 
2017).  Texas is one of twelve states with the most restrictive laws, out of thirty-one states that “have 
adopted laws restricting the ability of doctors to end life support for terminally ill pregnant women, 
regardless of the wishes of the patient or the family.”  Fernandez & Eckholm, supra.  Subsequently, in 
response to a petition by the family accompanied by a motion to compel, a judge ordered the hospital 
to remove Mrs. Marlise Muñoz from life support.  See Manny Fernandez, Texas Woman Is Taken Off 
Life Support After Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/us/texas-
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From a societal point of view, Casey has already allowed for the possibility 
that a woman be told, as if she did not already know, that there is a societal 
preference for life.218  Indeed, this position might be consistent with the view 
of “sanctity of life” that Dworkin describes as a major concern in the public 
abortion debate.  The danger lies where the social expression becomes a burden 
on a woman’s exercise of her personal fundamental right to choose.  It is 
extremely important to recognize that previability the woman’s right is 
conditioned only by her own health and nothing more.  This should not be a 
difficulty for most people to fathom provided the fetus is not perceived as a 
person, nor should the fetus be so perceived for the reasons already described.  
The position of this Article is that personhood occurs when moral agency is 
possible.  And such agency is not possible where a previable, non-sentient fetus 
 
hospital-to-end-life-support-for-pregnant-brain-dead-woman.html [https://perma.cc/U689-VPXJ]; see 
also Plaintiff’s Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Application for Unopposed Expedited 
Relief, Munoz v. John Peter Smith Hospital, No. 017-270080-14, 
http://thaddeuspope.com/images/Munoz_v._JPS_Jan_2014_.pdf [https://perma.cc/WHY4-XNQE]; 
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendants to Remove Marlise Munoz from “Life Sustaining” Measures 
and Application for Unopposed Expedited Relief, Munoz v. John Peter Smith Hospital, No. 017-
270080-14, http://thaddeuspope.com/images/Munoz_v._JPS_Jan_2014_.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X63-
PUUU].  Here, one might ask what does it matter if the state’s interest in preserving prenatal life should 
dominate since the woman is dead, except perhaps that the state would not be complying with her or 
her family’s wishes?  Still, if the reason for allowing people to make decisions concerning the disposal 
of their body after death include “ingrained notions of human dignity and respect for the dead,” as was 
a long-standing part of English common law, Disposal of the Dead: Legal Rights and Responsibilities, 
L. EXPLORER (May 19, 2016), https://lawexplores.com/disposal-of-the-dead-legal-rights-and-
responsibilities/ [https://perma.cc/H3EJ-L3GY], then it would matter that the woman’s interest is put 
aside because an important part of respect for persons should include respecting their decisions for 
dispositions of their bodies after death, at least to the same extent that it would apply were they still 
alive.  And while such a respect is never absolute, it seems hard to justify a restriction on what a woman 
might do with her body upon death based on an interest in preserving prenatal life when that same 
interest could not have prevented her from having a previable abortion were she alive.  Interestingly, 
in a case out of Ireland in December 2014, “Ireland’s high court ruled that doctors can switch off the 
life support machine of a brain-dead woman who is 18 weeks pregnant,” notwithstanding the doctors’ 
concern that “[u]nder the 8th Amendment of the Irish constitution the unborn child has the same rights 
as its mother even in this case.”  Henry McDonald, Brain-Dead Pregnant Woman’s Life Support Can 
Be Switched Off, Irish Court Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 26, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/26/ireland-court-rules-brain-dead-pregnant-womans-
life-support-switched-off [https://perma.cc/8QXY-S9G].  Similar to the Texas case, the doctors had 
refused to take the woman off life support for fear of prosecution.  Id.  And indeed, one can understand 
their concern especially given the broad language of the Irish constitution.  Still, in the context of a 
previable fetus, one must take pause to ask whether the court’s interpretation to allow removal quite 
rightly followed the view by the Irish Health Service “that the constitution was not designed to cope 
with cases where a brain-dead woman was kept alive because she was pregnant.”  Id.  If so, then 
viability here too is doing the important work in making the decision, as “[a]ll the medical experts who 
gave evidence in this case” agreed that “the chances of the unborn child surviving were minimal.”  Id. 
218. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992). 
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is developing in the womb.  To hold any different position would be to elevate 
a mere potential person to a status greater than that of an actual person.  What 
society can and should do in all such situations concerning prenatal life is to 
encourage all persons to think seriously about these issues, while not 
diminishing the rights of voluntary purposive human agents in the process.  It 
is this problem of how to bring a multicultural, pluralistic society to think better 
on such important questions that should play the central role in the abortion 
discussion, and not misguided assertions of the fetus as a person for purposes 
of Fourteenth Amendment legal protection. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown that recent claims to make the fetus a person for 
purposes of Fourteenth Amendment protection fail a test of reasonable 
objectivity as would be required to establish the desired protection in a 
pluralistic society.  It has also offered what a conception of personhood might 
look like that would fit a pluralistic application and, in effect, support the kinds 
of protections the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses currently acknowledge.  In the process of doing this, this Article takes 
serious the concern for potential life without denigrating the fundamental right 
of women to choose prior to viability whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, 
or after viability to terminate, if her life or health is seriously threatened.  
Abortion is a complex and, for many people, a very painful issue as it makes 
one confront some of the most basic questions about human existence: Who are 
persons?  Why is personhood of value?  Still, if the different positions are to be 
reconciled, clarity of both the language used and justification for the 
assumptions made is essential.  The abortion debate need not represent a threat 
to human dignity but rather the possibility of finding an answer to that all-
important complex moral question: To whom is morality due, and what is 
morality about? 
 
